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Abstract
We examine intra-household gender differentiated effects of property rights securitisation following
West Bengal’s tenancy registration program, using two independently gathered datasets. In both
samples, higher program implementation increased male child survival rates in families without
a first-born son, but not in those that already have a first-born male child. We argue this reflects
intensified son preference as land rights improve, ostensibly to ensure a male heir to inherit land.
Consistent with this, girls with first-born brothers also experience increased survival, but not girls
with first-born sisters. The gender bias manifests both in infant mortality rates, and the sex ratio at
birth.
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I
Secure property rights are considered a cornerstone of economic development. Land rights are partic-
ularly important in developing countries where large fractions of the population are dependent upon
agriculture. During 1955-2000 a billion people and nearly as many hectares were affected by land
reform (Lipton (2009)). Previous research demonstrates the importance of land security in increasing
agricultural productivity, facilitating access to credit, reducing poverty and cross-household asset in-
equality (Besley and Burgess (2000); Besley (1995); Besley and Ghatak (2010); Besley et al. (2016);
Goldstein and Udry (2008); Hornbeck (2010); Bardhan andMookherjee (2011); Bardhan et al. (2014)).
Effects of land reform on intra-household gender inequality, such as the problem of ‘missing women’ in
China and India, however, have not been examined, though other dimensions of this problem have been
studied by various authors (Almond et al. (2013a); Anderson and Ray (2010); Sen (2003); Bhalotra
(2010); Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010); Chakravarty (2010), Anukriti and Chakravarty (2017); Rose
(1999)).
In this paper we explore the hypothesis that land reformmay exacerbate an underlying preference for
sons and thereby increase gender inequality, in societies where land rights are heritable and primarily
inherited by sons (Abrevaya (2009); Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)). Gender differentiated preferences
among parents could conceivably result from a combination of motives: wealth effects which raise
survival chances differentially between boys and girls, and inheritance patterns that differ between male
and female children. There is some evidence of gender differentiated wealth effects in the literature,
which tends to show a bias in favor of females (E.g. see Rose (1999), Maccini and Yang (2009)),
but little evidence of an inheritance effect which might favor boys. A common pattern in patrilineal
societies is that daughters take their bequest at marriage as dowry and marry some distance from their
natal home (Guner (1999); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985)), while sons tend to co-reside with parents,
work on the land, and subsequently inherit it. Botticini and Siow (2003) postulate that a rationale for
the origin and persistence of these arrangements is that they incentivize sons to work on the father’s
land, contributing to wealth creation as well as old-age security. Primogeniture, or the practice that the
first son has first command over ancestral land, makes the first son particularly important. Hence, it
is plausible that land reform which awards land rights to the landless and small landowners, besides
raising land values via productivity improvements, would enhance the inheritance motive for ensuring
a male heir. This would be compounded if son preference arose also partly owing to a greater role
played by male children in cultivating land owned by the household.
The inheritance-cum-child labor motive would therefore generate a higher effect of the land reform
on survival chances of male children born in families without a first son, compared to those with a first
son. One would expect the corresponding wealth effects to be ordered the opposite way, since a first
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son if anything would be associated with higher household wealth. Hence a higher effect of the land
reform on survival of male children in families without a first son compared to those with a first son,
would indicate that the inheritance-cum-child labor motive dominates the wealth effect; the difference
between these two effects provides a lower bound to the magnitude of the former motive.
We exploit variation in land rights created by Operation Barga, a flagship tenancy reform in the
Indian state ofWest Bengal, that previous research has shown to have increased agricultural productivity
and farm incomes significantly (Banerjee et al. (2002); Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)). We find
evidence consistent with the co-existence of a male biased inheritance effect and female-biased wealth
effect: higher program implementation rates significantly raised survival chances of male children in
families without a first son, relative to those with a first son. The converse was observed in families with
a first son: survival chances of subsequent daughters rose, and those of subsequent sons were unaffected.
As the male biased inheritance motive does not operate among families with a first son, we interpret the
latter finding as reflecting wealth effects associated with the reform, which benefitted female rather than
male children, consistent with findings of previous literature (e.g. Anukriti (forthcoming); Bhalotra
and Cochrane (2010); Maccini and Yang (2009)). The effects are pronounced among Hindu families
(whose inheritance practices are known to be more male biased than non-Hindu families), and among
landless and small landowning households.
We find no evidence of corresponding effects of the land reform on gender or survival chances
of first-born children, consistent with the hypothesis that the gender of the first-born was effectively
random. The differential reform effects on survival of later born children across families depending on
the gender of the first-born therefore provide compelling evidence in support of our hypothesis, by thus
controlling for possible community-specific and household-specific confounding factors. Nevertheless
we confirm the results are robustwith respect to controls for pre-reform trends, mother or household fixed
effects, birth year and birth order fixed effects, mother’s age at birth, district-specific linear time trends
and district-year measures of rice productivity and infrastructure. Further, we obtain similar results
in separate investigations utilizing two independently gathered datasets varying in sample coverage,
questionnaires, and measures of land reform.
The land reform program involved registration of tenant farmers in West Bengal which endowed
them with heritable tenurial security and capped landlord shares. It was initiated by a Left Front
government elected in 1977. It is estimated that 2-3 million sharecropper tenants were registered
(half to two thirds of all tenants) by the mid-1990s, after which registration plateaued (Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2010)). Wemerge district-year data on the sharecropper registration rate between 1977-91
used in Banerjee et al. (2002) with the year and district of birth of children in the National Family
Health Survey (NFHS), which collects detailed household characteristics and fertility histories based
on questionnaires administered to a large sample of women. We combine this with other district-year
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level statistics put out by the Government of West Bengal for infrastructure, and rice productivity data
from ICRISAT.
The NFHS data allows us to separately examine effects of the land reform on sex ratios at birth,
infant mortality rates, and fertility. Our main regression uses the infant mortality rate before age 1
year as the dependent variable, reductions in which correspond to increased survival chances. We
find that passing a 50% registration rate (corresponding roughly to the median of the distribution of
implementation rates) was associated with a mortality rate reduction of 6.4 percentage points for boys at
birth order 2 or above in Hindu families without first sons, but not in families with first sons. Conversely,
there was a 6 percentage point reduction in infant mortality rates of girls (at birth order 2 and above)
in Hindu families with first sons, and no such reduction in those without first sons. The effects are
both statistically and quantitatively significant (the pre-reform mean mortality rate was 10.7 percentage
points). They are robust to our controls, including lagged district level sex ratios at birth (which proxy
for access to ultrasound facilities).1 The corresponding estimates for non-Hindu families are smaller
and statistically insignificant, though this may also reflect lower precision of estimates due to smaller
sample sizes.
Among Hindu families, we also find above-median registration rates had no impact on sex ratios
for first born children. Among later-born children however, it raised the proportion of boys born by 4.5
percentage points; an effect statistically significant at the 5% level and large compared to a pre-reform
ratio of 49.3%. The effect is present regardless of the gender of the first-born child, unlike in the infant
mortality results, where wealth effects from first sons appear to favour Hindu girls. The corresponding
effects are smaller and insignificant for non-Hindu families. As there was largely no access to ultrasound
facilities in most of rural West Bengal until the mid-1990s (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)), we interpret
the effects on sex ratios at birth as under-reporting of births of children that survived for very short
durations. As for effects of land reform on fertility, we find that above-median registration had no impact
on the likelihood that second-born children had a younger sibling in Hindu households, irrespective of
the gender of the first born child. Hence the differential effects observed for infant mortality among
boys and girls by the gender of the first-born cannot be attributed to larger household size (e.g., which
may strain household resources per child).2
These results are corroborated in a second data set, a village-household panel survey (VHPS)
conducted and used by Bardhan andMookherjee (2010), Bardhan andMookherjee (2011) and Bardhan
et al. (2014) to study impacts of the land reform on farm productivity and land inequality. This includes
data on proportion of cultivable land registered under Operation Barga at the village rather than district
1The results inclusive of controls for lagged district sex ratios are available upon request.
2However, a differential effect on fertility was observed when the registration rate crossed 25%, among Hindu and
non-Hindu families alike.
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level. This provides a more accurate measure of land reform implementation compared to the district
level data used with the NFHS exercise, for two reasons: it was collected directly from local land
records offices, and relies on land area estimates rather than proportion of sharecroppers registered.
The VHPS also includes data on landholdings at the household level, enabling us to separately estimate
land reform effects on child survival within households owning varying amounts of land prior to the
reform.
However, in this dataset we only observe number and ages of surviving children in the survey year
(2004), rather than separate data for births and infant mortality. We cannot therefore disentangle effects
on sex ratios at birth, infant mortality and subsequent fertility as was possible with the NFHS data. The
dependent variable accordingly is the likelihood of birth of a child of either gender in a given year (of
birth order 2 or above) that survived until 2004, which is regressed on extent of land reform implemented
in the village, interacted with gender of the first-born child (assumed to be the oldest surviving child).
Above-median land area registered in a village in a given district-year led to a 4.9 percentage point
greater effect on chances of a surviving boy being born following a first child who was a girl, compared
with families where the first child was a boy, consistent with the male-biased inheritance motive. This
estimate is significant at the 1% level, and robust to controls for household fixed effects, land owned
prior to the reform, land titles received under a parallel land reform program, and district-year fixed
effects. We find no evidence of wealth effects favouring girls born in first-son families in this dataset,
but this is potentially explained by the worsening of the post-reform sex ratio captured in the NFHS
results, that may counteract gains in female infant survival in these families. The differential effects in
later-born male child survival are significant (at the 5% level) among Hindu families, but not among
non-Hindu families, as in the NFHS data. The effects are concentrated among landless households and
among small landowners (owning between 1.25 and 2.5 acres of cultivable land). They were plausibly
the largest beneficiaries of the program: the landless owing to gaining secure and heritable cultivation
rights to leased land, and the small landowners owing to rising land values.
The results therefore provide compelling evidence of a significant male-biased inheritance motive
favoring survival of higher birth order male children in families without a first son. This motive co-
exists with wealth effects that favor survival of higher birth order female children in families with a
first son. The contrasting nature of the effects on infant mortality by the gender of the first born makes
it difficult to infer aggregate impact of the land reforms on gender imbalance in mortality rates in the
population as a whole. However, the NFHS results indicate that crossing the median registration rate
led to a significant 5 percentage point worsening of the sex ratio at birth for Hindu families, and a 3.8
point effect for all families, irrespective of the gender of the first-born. This suggests that the West
Bengal land reform worsened gender imbalance overall, while also raising productivity and incomes,
lowering inequality between households, raising education among low caste children (Deininger et al.
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(2011)) and lowering fertility (see Table 6).
A related paper (Almond et al. (2013b)) analyses the Chinese land reform during the late 1970s and
finds child gender ratios became more male-biased after land reform. The Chinese reform differed from
the West Bengal reform by retaining state control over allocation of land, whereby intergenerational
transfer of land within households was not assured. Moreover, men and women had equal rights in state
redistribution of land. Hence the inheritance mechanism that we focus on in this paper is unlikely to
have operated in a similar way in the Chinese context. Almond et al. argue a different set of channels
operated in China: income gains from land reform in China raised both the desire to have sons and the
feasibility of fulfilling this desire (for instance, by making it easier for them to afford travel to provincial
capitals for abortions).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion of
Operation Barga in West Bengal, and prevailing son preference norms in India. Section 3 sets out a
theoretical framework to structure and interpret the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data,
Section 5 outlines the empirical methodology, and Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7
concludes.
II Background
A Historical Context
Upon national independence in 1947, the Indian central government initiated three main types of
land reforms to address large historical inequalities in land distribution. These were abolition of
intermediaries, new tenancy laws to protect against eviction and extraction of excessive rental crop
shares by landlords, and land ceilings to limit the amount of land held by any one household with
the aim of vesting and redistributing surplus land to small farmers. Implementation of the reforms
was left to individual state governments. However, barring intermediary abolition in nearly all states,
landlords were able to subvert the remaining reform measures by way of pre-emptive tenant evictions
and parcelling land to relatives to avoid state confiscation of above-ceiling holdings (Appu (1996)).
Variation in state-level reform implementation and legislation over time has been used in previous
studies to empirically estimate land reform impacts on poverty, equity, and human capital (Besley and
Burgess (2000); Ghatak and Roy (2007); Ghosh (2008); Deininger et al. (2011)). West Bengal’s land
reformwas an unusual success amidst myriad failures, and a number of influential studies have analysed
its economic impacts (Banerjee et al. (2002); Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011); Bardhan et al. (2012);
Bardhan et al. (2014)).
Reforms in the state of West Bengal were spurred by the outcome of the 1977 state assembly
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election, following a Maoist land-based movement in late 1960s. The Left Front coalition won an
absolute majority, which it retained until 2011. This new government created a three-tier system of
local governments called panchayats, which for the first time would be democratically elected. These
tiers in descending order of size of jurisdiction were district, block, and finally the gram panchayat that
operated at the village level with a jurisdiction of 10-15 hamlets (mouzas). Many national development
programmes as well as aspects of new state welfare initiatives such as Operation Barga were then
decentralised to gram panchayats, who were responsible for selecting local eligible beneficiaries and
lobbying the upper tiers of the new system for funds (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)).
B Operation Barga and the Green Revolution
West Bengal, along with Kerala, was an exceptional state in terms of the effort and success with which
the state government pursued land reforms. Registration protected sharecroppers from eviction by
landlords, giving them permanent, tenancy rights and capping the share of the crop payable as rent to
landlords to 25 percent. The tenancy rights could be used as collateral for loans and could be passed on
to their heirs. By 1981 over 1 million sharecropper tenants were registered, and almost 1.5 million by
1990 (Lieten (1992)). Estimates of the fraction of sharecroppers registered in the state range from 45%
(Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)), to 65% (Banerjee et al. (2002)), to as high as 80% (Lieten (1992)).
Besides Operation Barga, the state also aimed to vest land held by households above the stipulated
ceiling of 12.5 acres and redistribute it to the landless and small landowners in small plots (or pattas).
Most vesting of land had already taken place by 1978, so the Left Front government’s main role was in
redistributing this land. Appu (1996) estimates that 6.72 percent of state operated area was distributed
by 1992; several times the national average of 1.34 percent. However, this landwas redistributed in small
plots (less than half an acre on average in the sample of farms in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)), and
was of low quality for cultivation as landlords would only part with their lowest quality above-ceiling
holdings. Hence unlike tenant registration, land redistribution had virtually no impact on agricultural
productivity (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)) while lowering the incidence of landlessness (Bardhan
et al. (2014)).
There were other government initiatives launched in the state at the same time, including decen-
tralization, local infrastructure investment and programmes aimed at boosting agricultural productivity
and reducing poverty. Alongside Operation Barga, the state government also distributed minikits con-
taining high yield variety (HYV) seeds, fertilisers, and insecticides to farmers throughout the state via
gram panchayats. Land reform in combination with minikit distribution led to a substantial increase in
agricultural yields inWest Bengal over the 1980s, transforming the state into one of the best agricultural
performers in the country and leading this period to be called West Bengal’s Green Revolution. This
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period is also associated with significant declines in poverty and growth in rural employment. Banerjee
et al. (2002) attributed the increase in yields to land reform, citing decreased Marshall-Mill share-
cropping distortions from increased tenancy security. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) however shows
that while decreased inefficiencies played a role in increasing yields, it was largely minikit distribution
that was responsible for the agricultural growth in this period. Other programmes administered in the
1980s with gram panchayats targeting local beneficiaries include the Integrated Rural Development
Programme that provided subsidised credit, and employment initiatives such as the Food for Work pro-
gramme, the National Rural Employment Programme, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Programme.
C Son Preference
Themajority Hindu community in India traditionally exhibits greater son preference than other religious
communities, as evidenced by conditional sex ratios in the population and empirical evidence on child
mortality and education that reflect childhood parental investments (Bhalotra and Zamora (2009);
Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010); Bhalotra (2010)). The literature in this regard has focused on Hindu-
Muslim differences, as other religious communities make up a very small part of the population.
While no definitive explanation has been agreed upon for the differing degrees of son preference
between the Indian Hindu and Muslim communities, existing arguments such as the Dyson-Moore
hypothesis base them in marital institutions and inheritance practices. In North India including West
Bengal, Hindu marriage is exogamous for women, who leave their natal family village to marry into
families in villages much further away to avoid marrying a possible relative. The distance from natal
family after marriage reduces Hindu women’s bargaining power and also their claim to natal family
land, which is seen as bringing no reciprocal benefit and lost to the family when daughters inherit. Sons
on the other hand care for parents and natal family members in their old age by remaining with the natal
family and working the family land, eventually inheriting it upon the death of the family patriarchs.
Cultural taboos against Hindu women sharing public spaces with men and working agricultural land
also often prevent them from claiming and cultivating land (Agarwal (2003)). The bridal dowry practice
also often entails loss or mortgage of family land at the time of a daughter’s marriage. With regard
to Operation Barga specifically, Gupta (2002) finds from interviews of 870 households in two West
Bengal districts that 99% of households reported dowry being a serious concern, and that mortgaging
barga land to meet dowry payments was a common practice. She also finds that dowry was largely a
Hindu practice, but that the custom has penetrated younger generations of Muslims.
Under theMitaksharaHindu doctrine followed in North India, women have no claim to joint family
property, whereas men are entitled at birth to a share of such family property held by their fathers,
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paternal grandfathers, and paternal great-grandfathers. In South India close-kin marriages are more
prevalent for Hinduwomen, allowing them to inherit a greater share of ancestral land as they reside close
enough to participate in cultivation on natal family land after marriage. These marital institutions have
been used to explain more favourable female-male sex ratios in South India compared to North India
(Chakraborty and Kim (2010)). InWest Bengal theDayabhagaHindu system of inheritance is followed
where the concept of joint family property is absent, and all of a Hindu male’s property is subject to
equal claims by his widow, sons, and daughters upon his intestate death (Lingat (1973)). While this
appears more gender-equal than the Mitakshara system in theory, in practice Hindu women nearly
always relinquish their inheritance claims to their brothers and sons so as to avoid social exclusion,
intimidation, and losing the family safety net in times of financial crisis (Agarwal (2003)). Hindu upper
caste women also do not physically work agricultural land due to prevailing social norms. Lower caste
women have higher work-force participation rates in agriculture as wage labourers, but still female
employment rates in agriculture in the state have been persistently low. Hindu women therefore are
very much financially dependent on their male kin, leading them to give up their rights to family land
to avoid losing that support. These unequal gender norms governing labour market participation have
also been argued to contribute to son preference, as they increase the household returns to having sons
relative to daughters (Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982)).
Muslim communities follow inheritance practices based in the Shariat, which guarantees women at
least half as much inheritance as their closest male counterpart inheritors. Consanguineous marriage
is also practiced to keep all ancestral property within the family, allowing Muslim women to remain
close to their natal families after marriage and inherit more family property in practice similar to
Hindu women in South India. Marital dowry is also less prevalent among Muslims, and abortion, sex
selective or otherwise, is strictly forbidden under the Shariat. The effect of these institutions arguably
reduces parental neglect of Muslim female children compared to Hindu female children in many parts
of the country including West Bengal, despite the fact that the Muslim minority population experience
nationally higher levels of poverty than theHindumajority andMuslim female labour force participation
in West Bengal is even lower than that of Hindu women (Nasir and Kalla (2006); Chakraborty and
Chakraborty (2010)).
III Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use two independently gathered household survey data sets, both representative of the state of West
Bengal: the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) focusing on fertility and child health, and a village-
household panel survey (VHPS) conducted to gather data on land reform and its partial and general
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equilibrium effects on farm productivity and land distribution (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)). We
use them in two separate empirical analyses, so as to take advantage of the unique features of each data
set.
The strengths of the NFHS data are that it records the entire birth history of all women aged 13 or
15 to 49 at the time of the survey, allowing us to identify the exact date of birth and death for children.
Moreover, we have fertility histories for biological mothers, so we can identify the birth order and sex
of every child, allowing us to construct an indicator for the sex of the first born child. Nevertheless,
there is a possibility of underreporting of births of some children that died very soon after birth (at
home). For this reason we shall also examine effects of the reform on the sex ratio at birth (among
reported births). As mentioned previously, the possibility of sex selective abortion was low during the
period being studied owing to the lack of availability of ultrasound scan facilities in rural West Bengal
until the mid-1990s. Hence unbalanced sex ratios at birth are likely to reflect under-reporting of births
of children that survived a very short period.
The weaknesses of the NFHS data are twofold. First, we do not have access to reliable data on
land reform implementation in all the villages represented in the NFHS data. Hence we use the district
level share of tenant farmers registered (from Banerjee et al. (2002)) as a measure of land reform
implementation. Second, we do not have data on land owned by each household, so cannot examine
heterogeneity of impacts across different land classes. In all of the analysis, the dependent variables are
at the individual level. Since the treatment is at the district level, we account for the non-independence
of the errors within the treatment unit.
These problems do not arise in theVHPS, which covers a different sample of villages and households
and includes data on household demographics and land details, as well as land reform at the village level.
The household level data includes family histories and land ownership since 1967. The questionnaire
elicited information from the head about all members residing in the household in 2004, including the
year they were born or joined the household. It reports the births of all children in the household, but
only for those that survived till 2004. We therefore have a compound measure of birth and survival. For
approximately two-thirds of the households in the sample, a consistent history of household landholdings
and demographics could be constructed (we call this the “restricted sample”; details are in Bardhan
et al. (2014)). For the rest a consistent history could be constructed under specific assumptions on
the nature of recall errors. While we report only results from the restricted sample, we verify that the
results do not differ qualitatively in the full sample.
Information on land reform implemented in each of the 89 surveyed villages between 1968-98 was
collected from Block Land Records Offices. The strength of the land reform data is that it is at the
village level rather than the district level. Moreover it was compiled firsthand from official land records
rather than in aggregated form from indirect sources (the authenticity of which in West Bengal has
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often been questioned (see, e.g., Boyce (1987)). Data quality aside, the share of cultivable village land
registered is likely to be a better measure than the share of tenants registered, because it overcomes the
concern with the latter that it may provide a misleading measure of the intensity of the program if the
potential number of tenants is small, but most of them are registered.
On the other hand, the VHPS data has the drawback that it comes from a survey conducted in 2004,
where the demographic module includes birth years of all members residing in the household in that
year. This enables us to measure children born during a past year who survived until 2004, i.e., the joint
outcome of birth in some year t prior to 2004, and survival of this child until the year 2004. Children
who were born but did not survive until 2004 are not reported. So we cannot separately estimate land
reform effects on fertility and infant mortality.
A Descriptive Statistics
We pool the 1992-93 and 1998-99 waves of the NFHS as these rounds contain a district identifier for
every household. The data are transposed to create identifiers for the district and year of birth of every
child, and then merged with district-level sharecropper registration rates for the 14 districts for which
the data is available (from Banerjee et al. (2002)).
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the tenant registration rate over time. There is no positive registration
recorded in the data prior to 1978, although registration of tenants had begun under the previous
government. Sharecropper registration occurred most rapidly up until about 1983, after which the
pace slowed considerably. Our analysis is confined to births during 1978-1991, as we do not have
information on district-level programs other than land reform after this year.
Figure 2 shows the alternative measure of land reform (proportion of villages above the median
share of land registration) from the VHPS data. It shows there was some reform prior to 1977, but
the pace picked up between 1978 and 1985, slowed down between 1985-89, and plateaued thereafter.
The overall time pattern is very similar to Figure 1. In the regressions we will use the period 1978-98;
the exact choice of end year does not really matter as there was very little additional reforms being
implemented during the 1990s.
Panels A and B of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics pertaining to characteristics of children in
the NFHS sample born during 1967-93 and their mothers. Neonatal and infant mortality rates were
6.4% and 9.4% respectively. The probability that a child is male was 51.1%, and the probability of the
child having a younger sibling was 71.8%. 68% of mothers resided in rural areas; the average age at
which they give birth was 19.03 years. The average years of education of mothers in the sample is 3.42
years and they have an average of 3.39 births. 75% of mothers are Hindu.
We obtained district-level data on yields and area under cultivation of rice in West Bengal from the
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ICRISAT Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA) database to construct measures of annual district
rice productivity in thousands of tonnes of output per one thousand hectares for the years 1977-1990.
We also collected district time series information from the annual Economic Survey reports of the West
Bengal government to control for the effects of other programmes and infrastructure. Specifically, we
gathered information on the number of medical institutions per capita, kilometres of surfaced roads
per capita, and hectares of patta land distributed per capita. Descriptive statistics for the district-year
varying controls are in Panel C of Table 1.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics from the VHPS data, for the period 1978-98 used in the
regressions. 80% households were Hindu; 25% had immigrated into the village since 1967. Half
were landless, 16% were marginal landowners owning less than 1.25 acres of cultivable land, 9% were
small owners owning between 1.25 and 2.5 acres, while 25% owned more than 2.5 acres. Average land
owned was 2.23 acres. Panel B shows the average likelihood of a male and female child being born
in any given year between 1978-98 and surviving till 2004 was 6.0% and 6.4% respectively. Panel
C reports relevant village level characteristics: the mean proportion of village land registered (across
different village-years) was 5.1%. To make results comparable to those from the NFHS sample, in
the regressions we measure the extent of reform activity as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
cumulative percentage of village cultivable land registered under sharecropping (barga) is above the
median (computed at the village-year level).
In the VHPS data we can control for the land redistribution component of the program, which
involved awarding titles to small plots (pattas) to farmers. Approximately 15% of surveyed households
had received patta land by 1998. However, as discussed in Bardhan andMookherjee (2011) andBardhan
et al. (2014), the patta program did not raise farm productivity appreciably, because the distributed
plots were small and of poor quality, and were not eligible to be used as collateral for subsidized
credit. In contrast, plots registered under barga (the tenancy reform) were of a much larger size (1.5
acres on average), and could be used as collateral for loans from state financial institutions, yielding
greater positive impacts on rice productivity. Hence we focus on Operation Barga rather than the land
distribution program.
IV Model and Predicted Effects of Land Reform
Under Operation Barga, agricultural tenants benefited directly in two respects, increased land security
and a greater share of agricultural output. At the same time, the reform reduced land rights and rents
of landlords. These comprise the direct partial equilibrium (PE) effects. The reform also generated a
number of general equilibrium (GE) effects. Reduced profitability of leasing out land induced large
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landowners to sell some of their landholdings to smaller landowners, lowering land inequality (Bardhan
et al. (2014)). In addition, there were positive effects on land productivity across all farms, both owner
cultivated and tenanted (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)), owing partly to induced investments in
minor irrigation which lowered water prices in the village (Bardhan et al. (2012)).
Our hypothesis is that there were two kinds of impacts of the reform on the value placed by
(predominantly Hindu) families on children: (i) wealth effects benefitting children of both genders,
possibly differing across gender, and (ii) a property inheritance effect favoring boys in families without
a prior son. Both effects vary with birth-order and gender of elder children. The following model
describes these disparate effects and helps generate testable predictions.
Let β denote the measure of land reform (LR) implemented in a given village. The resulting wealth
of household j is
(1) W j(β) = θ(β)[l j + βt(l j)]
where θ denotes land value which is rising in β owing to the GE productivity enhancing effects of the
reform. Land owned by the household is denoted by l j and the change in land rights owing to the reform
is given by βt(l j), where t(l) is a decreasing function, satisfying t(0) > 0, positive over an interval (0, l∗)
and negative if l > l∗. This captures both the direct PE effect and the GE effect of the reform through
land markets: positive for the landless leasing in land, decreasing in land owned (reflecting negative
correlation between land leased in and land owned), and negative for large landowners who own more
than l∗ and lease out land.
The resulting impact on the value placed by household j on child i of birth order two or above is
(2) vi j = [a + (δ1 + δ2 f j)(1 − mi) + {δ3 f j + pi(1 − f j)}mi]W j(β)
The first term on the right hand side of (2) is a common wealth effect: for each unit increase in
wealth a ≥ 0 is an increased value on children of both genders. mi is a dummy variable for male
gender of the child in question, while f j is a dummy for male gender of the first-born child. The term
(δ1 + δ2 f j) represents the supplemental wealth effect for a female child, which depends on the gender
of the firstborn: δ1 represents the gender bias in the wealth effect in a family without a first son, while
δ1 + δ2 in a family with a first son. The sign of δ1 is ambiguous, while we expect δ2 to be positive
(based on previous findings in the literature; e.g. see Anukriti (forthcoming); Bhalotra and Cochrane
(2010)). δ3 is a corresponding wealth effect on the value of a male child, which is nonnegative.
The parameter pi ≥ 0 represents the property inheritance effect, which is biased in favor of boys,
and operates only in families without a first son. The difference between the LR effect on male child
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survival in families without and with a first son equals (pi − δ3)W′j(β). Since δ3 is nonnegative, this
difference provides a lower bound to the size of the male-biased inheritance effect piW′j(β).
How do the predicted effects vary with the land owned by the household? Notice that
(3)
∂W j
∂β
= θ′(β)l j + {βθ′(β) + θ(β)}t(l j)
The first term on the RHS (which reflects the GE effect of LR on land productivity) increases in land
owned l j . The second term (which includes both the direct PE effect as well as a GE productivity effect)
is proportional to the effect of the reform on land rights/rents, which is decreasing in l j . Hence the net
effect could be non-monotone in land owned. For the landless we have l j = 0 and the first term drops
out; as t(0) > 0 we expect a positive effect resulting from the access gained by landless households
leasing in land to more secure and lucrative tenurial terms. The predicted effect continues to be positive
for a range of marginal and small landowners with l j < l∗. For those owning land in excess of l∗ we
have t(l j) < 0 and the second term is negative, offsetting the positive GE productivity effect represented
by the first term. Hence the expected sign for large landowners is ambiguous.
In the NFHS data set, we observe infant mortality of children born, but lack data on landholdings of
each household, so we cannot examine how the predicted effects vary with landholdings. We observe
households’ district of residence rather than their village of residence, and have a measure of land
reform at the district level. Hence the predicted infant mortality (IM) of child i in family j in district k
in year t can be expressed as follows:
IMi j kt = γ0 − γ1βkt − γ2βkt ∗ f j − γ3βkt ∗ mi − γ4βkt ∗ mi ∗ f j
− γ5 f j − γ6mi − γ7 f j ∗ mi(4)
The LR effect is measured for a household with average landholding θ(β)[E{l j} + βE{t(l j)}], where
E denotes an expectation operator with respect to l j . Table 3 displays the combination of these γ
coefficients to the relevant model parameters within parentheses at the bottom of each cell. The LR
effectmay be nonlinear in β sowe shall proxy it by indicators for crossing different thresholds or different
quartiles of the distribution of LR across district-years. The corresponding regression specification is
provided in the next subsection.
To the extent that births of children that survived very short periods were under-reported, we can
use the NFHS data to examine the effects of the land reform on sex ratio at birth (from the reported
births). This is an alternative way of testing effects on infant mortality among very young children.
The expression for the predicted effects is slightly different from (4) as the dependent variable is Mj kt ,
an indicator for male gender of a child born to a given mother j in district k a given year t, and child
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gender indicators are dropped from the right hand side:
(5) Mjvt = γ0 − γ1βvt − γ2βvt ∗ f j − γ5 f j
We also examine LR effects on fertility, by estimating the likelihood that a given child exposed to
the reforms has a younger sibling, and allowing this to vary with gender of the first born child. The
expression for predicted land reform effects on this outcome is similar to (4), but contains only the f j
terms. Details of the corresponding regression specifications are provided in the next subsection.
In the VHPS dataset we do not directly observe infant mortality of children that were born. Instead
we observe number of surviving children (in 2004) that were born in a given year within the LR
implementation phase 1978-98. In other words, we observe outcomes of the joint event of birth and
survival, rather than survival conditional on birth. This incorporates non-reporting of children that did
not survive. In this dataset we observe the land owned by each household, so we can both control for
and interact landholdings with variables in the regression. With too many interactions, the regression
becomes difficult to interpret. So predicted LR effects for BSi j (the joint event of birth and survival of
child i in household j in village v in year t) can be expressed separately for female (F) and male (M)
children as follows:
(6) BSFi jvt = −γ0 + γ1βvt + γ2βvt ∗ f j + γ5 f j
(7) BSMi j = (γ6 − γ0) + (γ1 + γ3)βvt + (γ2 + γ4)βvt ∗ f j + (γ5 + γ7) f j
as well as separately for each landownership category l (landless, marginal, small or large) of the
household in 1977:
(8) BSFi jlvt = (γ6l − γ0l) + (γ1l + γ3l)βvt + (γ2l + γ4l)βvt ∗ f j + (γ5l + γ7l) f j
(9) BSMi jlvt = (γ6l − γ0l) + (γ1l + γ3l)βvt + (γ2l + γ4l)βvt ∗ f j + (γ5l + γ7l) f j
A Empirical Specification
A.1 NFHS households
We estimate the equations above for infant mortality, the probability of a male birth and fertility-
stopping in the NFHS data, using OLS on the sample of children of birth order two or higher born
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during 1978-91.3 We carry out separate estimations for Hindu and non-Hindu children to account for
the different institutional practices between communities described earlier. As the indicator of reform
varies at the district level and there are only 14 districts, the standard errors are wild cluster-bootstrapped
(Cameron et al. (2008)), using the procedure in Busso et al. (2013).4 For the infant mortality outcome,
we estimate the predicted effects of LR in (4) using the following specification:
IMi j kt = τ + ρ1 R50k,t−1 ∗ f irstson j ∗ malei + ρ2 R50k,t−1 ∗ malei
+ ρ3 R50k,t−1 ∗ f irstson j + ψ1 f irstson j + ψ2malei + ψ3 f irstson j ∗ malei
+ η R50k,t−1 + λ Xi j kt + ζk + νt + i j kt
(10)
where IMi j kt is a dummy variable taking value 1 if child i of mother or household h, born in district
k in year t died aged 0-12 months and 0 otherwise, R50kt−1 is a LR indicator which takes the value
1 if sharecropper registration rate in district k reaches at least 50% respectively in the year preceding
the childâĂŹs birth year t, and 0 otherwise. The omitted category of children constitutes of girls with
first-born sisters born in districts where registration was less than 50% in the year preceding birth,
or “untreated” by land reform. We chose this threshold rate based on estimates from a more flexible
specification, and by the fact that 50% registration roughly coincides with the median registration rate
in the child-level distribution of registration rates in the estimation sample (which was 48.5%).5 Note
that we would only expect linearity in the registration rate if all districts had the same tenancy rates at
baseline, which was not the case. The variable f irstson j indicates households with a first-born son and
malei indicates that the index child is male. We exclude first-born children from the sample, but also
verify that the reforms did not affect mortality among first-borns. The estimated coefficients in (10)
capture LR impacts by child gender and gender of the first-born child; Table 3 relates these coefficients
(in square brackets) to the predicted LR effects in the model, yielding (ρ1 + ρ3) as a lower-bound
estimate of pi.
Since all districts in West Bengal experienced tenant registration and the variation is only in rates of
progression, we also report results from estimating (10) including children born in bordering districts
in the neighbouring state of Bihar as a control group, as these children are never exposed to land reform.
3We verify that land reform did not affect the mortalty of first-born children; see Table A.1. We also check for consistency
of estimates by including first-born children in the sample and coding the first-born son indicator as zero for these first-borns,
and by restricting the sample to the first two children only. The results do not change, and are available from the authors
upon request.
4We also estimate a specification with an AR1 process for the standard errors, and the results are largely unchanged; see
Appendix Table A.2.
5We tested for significant effects of cumulative sharecropper registration rates in 10 percent increments, and we tested
for a quadratic in registration rates. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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There are effectively four dimensions across which we exploit differences to achieve identification,
which are district, year of birth, child gender, and the gender of the first-born child in the household.
The impacts are identified independently of child birth year and district fixed effects captured in dummy
variables νt and ζk . We test robustness to including district-specific linear trends in child birth year to
control for district specific unobservable trends that may be simultaneously correlatedwith sharecropper
registration rates and infant mortality risk. The covariate vector Xi j kt includes indicators for child birth
order, household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment,
and linear and quadratic terms in the age of the mother at the birth of the child.6 So as to allow for
individual selection into programme uptake or fertility, we also estimate the specification with mother
fixed effects. Mother fixed effects absorb district fixed effects since mothers typically do not migrate
between births.
Productivity was increasing in West Bengal in the period studied, partly owing to the land reform,
which generates the GE effect of the land reform explained in the previous section. To gain some insight
into the magnitude of the PE effect, we examine the effects of controlling for increased agricultural
yields. Specifically, we estimate specifications including the log of district productivity of rice in the
year prior to the child’s birth as a regressor, interacted with indicators for the sex of the first-born child
and the sex of the second or higher-order index child. Rice is the major crop inWest Bengal, accounting
for more than 70% of gross cropped area during 1971-1991 according to state government economic
reviews, but we also controlled for yield of all other cereals.
To further control for any confounding effects of public health improvements, infrastructure de-
velopment, and the other arm of the land reform, we include controls for the logarithm of medical
institutions per capita, kilometres of surfaced road per capita, and hectares of patta land distributed
per capita in the district in the year preceding the child’s birth, and their interactions with index child
gender and the gender of the first-born child.
We then investigate the predicted impacts of LR on the sex ratio at birth as expressed in (6). We
define an outcome variable taking value 1 if child i is male and 0 otherwise. The regressor of interest,
as before, is median registration ate indicator R50kt−1 interacted with the indicator for a first-born son
f irstson j . We first test our assumption that the sex of first births is quasi-random and unaffected by
the reforms. We then estimate the equation for second and higher order births to test whether sex at
birth is modified by land reform in the same direction as sex after birth (via infant mortality). The sex
of a birth is, of course, conditional upon fertility. We assess any selection bias by estimating fertility
6To control for possible confounding effects of the spread of fetal sex determination technology such as ultrasound across
West Bengal and all of India in the 1980s, we also test our results for robustness to the inclusion of the lagged district-level
sex ratio at birth, calculated from the NFHS data as proxy for access to such technology; an approach used previously in the
literature (Hu and Schlosser (2015)). The results are almost completely unchanged, and available upon request.
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responses to tenancy reform, which is also of interest in its own right.
Finally, to investigate whether tenancy reform influenced fertility, we estimate an equation with the
dependent variable an indicator taking value 1 if index child i has a younger sibling and 0 otherwise.
Given evidence that fertility-stopping behaviour at any time is sensitive to the sex composition of
preceding children, and evidence that the sex of the first born is quasi-random, we interact the median
registration rate indicator R50kt−1 with the first-born son indicator f irstson j . In fact, we find fertility
responses at below-median levels of registration, so we include a further R25kt−1 indicator taking value
1 if registration in district k was at least 25% in the year preceding the child’s birth, and its corresponding
interaction with the first-born son indicator. We estimated these specifications sequentially for separate
samples of children by birth order, so as to identify the margin at which households alter childbearing in
response to land reform. We found no impact of land reform on fertility-stopping after the first birth (see
Appendix Table A.3) and also no impacts on stopping after the third birth (available upon request). We
therefore present estimates for stopping after the second birth, which is plausibly the relevant margin.
A.2 Test for Targeting of Sharecropper Registration
If the rate of tenant registration was correlated with pre-reform trends in the outcome variables, the
estimated impacts of registration on the outcomes may be spurious. For instance, registration may have
progressedmore rapidly in districts wheremale infant mortality was already declining faster than female
infant mortality (and more so in households with first-born daughters). To investigate this, we use pre-
reform data on the outcomes. Since registration is a continuous variable we discretize it by assigning
districts as âĂĲtreatedâĂİ or not depending on whether they had achieved above or below-median
levels of registration by 1985. We chose 1985 because registration occurred most rapidly up until 1985
(see Figure 1). We use a sample of children of birth order 2 or higher born before the programme,
during 1958-77. We then regress the outcomes of interest on “treated” interacted with a linear time
trend. A significant coefficient on this interaction term will reveal whether district pre-programme
trends in the outcomes were correlated with a district becoming a “treated” (or high intensity reform)
district in the future. Since the main equations are estimated with first-son interactions, the stricter test
of pre-trends includes this interaction. The estimated equation for infant mortality for instance is:
IMi j kt = τ + κ1 treatedk ∗ trendt ∗ f irstson j ∗ malei
+ three − way interactions + two − way interactions + main e f f ects
+ λXi j kt + ζk + νt + i j kt
(11)
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where IMi j kt is the infant mortality outcome for child i of mother or household j, born in district k in
year t. treated is the indicator for above-median district registration in 1985, trend is a linear time
trend for the pre-reform years 1958-77 and we include all three and two-way interactions and main
effects though these are not displayed. The covariates included in Xi j kt are the same as in (10), except
that controls for other district programmes and infrastructure are not included here as they are not
available for the pre-reform years. We estimate analogous equations for the other outcomes, fertility
and the sex ratio at birth.
A.3 VHPS Data
As noted earlier, the VHPS data do not contain full birth histories or exact dates of death, so we
are unable to directly identify either infant mortality or fertility. Instead, we model as outcomes the
probability of a surviving girl, and a surviving boy being observed in 2004 (the last round of the village
survey) in response to land registered under Operation Barga during 1982-95. We estimate the predicted
LR effects in (6) and (7) using the following specification:
(12) BSsi jvt = τ + φ
s
1LRvt + φ
s
2LRvt ∗ f irstson j + ςXi jvt + νt + ζ j + i jvt
where s ∈ {F,M}. BSsi jvt takes the value 1 if a surviving child i is born in household j in village v
in year t, and 0 otherwise. Specifically by child gender, the outcome variable takes value 1 when the
surviving child i born in year t is a boy (girl), and value 0 if there is no birth in year t, or if there is
a surviving birth in year t that is a girl (boy). The dummy variable LRvt takes the value 1 when the
cumulative percentage of village cultivable land registered under sharecropping falls above the median
percentage of village land registered in year t in the district-year distribution.7 As with the NFHS
data, we interact the above-median land reform indicator with an indicator for the first child in the
household being male, f irstson j . We set f irstson j equal to 1 if the oldest observed surviving child
in the household is male, and 0 otherwise. The estimates of φs1 and φ
s
1 + φ
s
2 therefore identify the
predicted LR effects for boys (s = M) and girls (s = F) without and with first-born male siblings
respectively, and are shown in curly brackets with the corresponding predicted effects they identify in
Table 3. The model predictions in (8) and (9) are identified by estimating (12) separately by household
landholding category for each child gender. The terms νt and ζ j are year and household fixed effects
respectively, and i jvt is an idiosyncratic error term. Household fixed effects absorb village fixed effects,
since mothers typically do not migrate between births, and account for potentially correlated regional
heterogeneity and household level selection.
7Results are robust to replacing land reform in year t by land reform in years t − 1 or t − 2.
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The regressors Xi jvt include (lagged) land owned by the household, an above-ceiling indicator
(whether it owned more land than permitted by the land ceiling), and patta land distribution. We
define landowning classes, household land holdings, and the land ceiling indicator using pre-reform
reported household landholdings in 1977, to avoid endogenous sample selection on landholdings that
may change due to the reform. Finally, we examine how results are affected upon controlling for
district-year fixed effects, which control flexibly for any relevant time-varying unobservables at the
district level, including the GE effect of the reform.
V Empirical Results from the NFHS Data
A Results for Infant Mortality
Figures 3(a)-3(c) shows event study graphs of land reform impacts on infant mortality for Hindu
children of different birth orders and gender, across years varying in distance from the achievement
of the median registration rate. These effects are produced by estimating (10) after replacing the
above-median registration indicator R50k,t−1 with indicators for years before and years after median
registration in district k, with the year that median registration is reached as the omitted category. All
the controls barring those for other programmes and rice productivity are included in the regressions,
as well as district-specific linear time trends. Among firstborn children in Figure 3(a) we see a decline
in mortality rates for both boys and girls, with no significant gender difference. Among higher birth
order children with a first born sister in Figure 3(b), mortality rates for boys drop while those of girls
rise. When the first child is a son, the mortality rate of boys drops slightly in Figure 3(c) but more
sharply for girls.
Table 4 reports the regression estimates from (10) for infant mortality with the full set of controls.8
Columns (1)-(3) provide the results for the entire sample, and columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) show the
results for the sub-samples of Hindu and non-Hindu families respectively. For each of these samples,
the first column shows estimates conditional on district fixed effects, the next column adds lagged
controls for the log of district rice productivity, and the final column further adds a district-specific
linear time trend. The estimated marginal effects are shown by the gender of the index child and of
the first-born child at the bottom of each column.9 Like the regression coefficients, these are reported
in comparison to the omitted group of girls with first-born sisters who are unexposed to land reform.
We calculate the statistical significance of the marginal effects using robust standard errors clustered
8We supress the j, v, and k subscripts on the regressors for simplicity of exposition.
9Appendix Table A.4 reports corresponding results with cubic and quartic productivity controls. The estimates and
marginal effects turn out to be robust to these controls, and are in fact often larger and more strongly significant for both the
Hindu and Non-Hindu samples.
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at the district level, which likely over-estimate significance levels due to the small number of clusters.
However, the statistical significance levels of the interaction terms in the coefficient estimates are an
accurate indication of differing reform impacts by the gender of the index child and the first-born child,
as these are calculated using the wild cluster bootstrap.
In the pooled sample, we find a statistically significant decline of 3.9-4.4 percentage points in infant
mortality for boys in households without first-born sons in columns (1)-(3) following above-median
tenant registration, indicated by the coefficient on R50k,t−1 ∗ male. There are no such perceptible
declines for girls without first-born brothers, as the coefficient estimate on R50k,t−1 is close to zero and
statistically insignificant. The post-reform decline in infant mortality for girls with first-born brothers,
indicated by the coefficient estimate for R50k,t−1 ∗ f irstson, is also insignificant, but appears larger at
3.4-3.5 percentage points. The estimated coefficient for R50k,t−1 ∗ f irstson ∗ male suggests that the
mortality decline for boys with first-born brothers is smaller than that for girls with first-born brothers,
but is not statistically significant.
We find sharper evidence of gender-differentiated reform effects in the Hindu sample of households
in columns (4)-(6). We confirm the results expected from the event study graphs: a statistically
significant reduction of 6.0-6.6 percentage points in mortality rates among girls in Hindu families with
a first son, and of 5.6-6.4 percentage points among later sons in Hindu families without a first son.
Both these results are consistent with our model predictions, and are precisely estimated as significantly
different from the effects for other first-born and index child combinations (later sons with first son, and
later girls without a first son). In fact for these other combinations, we fail to find a persistently significant
effect. The estimated mortality declines for girls with first-born brothers and boys without first-born
brothers are robust to the successive inclusion of district fixed effects, rice productivity controls, and
district-specific linear time trends, and are significantly larger and more precisely estimated than those
for the pooled sample in columns (1)-(3).
The richest specification in column (6) yields a lower-bound estimate for themale-biased inheritance
effect pi of 3.4 percentage points among Hindu households; a large effect compared to the pre-reform
infantmortality rate of 10.7 percentage points, but statistically insignificant. Among non-Hindu families
in columns (7)-(9), we estimate sizeable reductions inmortality rates for all combinations in the columns
(7)-(9), albeit imprecisely. Hence the patterns appear to be dissimilar between Hindu and non-Hindu
families: in the latter, higher birth order children appear to experience mortality reductions even when
the first born has the same gender. However, owing to the small size of the non-Hindu sample we do
not find statistical significance in these differences.
A specification that incorporates mother fixed effects in Appendix Table A.5 also produces broadly
similar estimates to those in this table. The coefficient estimates for the productivity controls are
reported in Appendix Table A.6. Appendix Table A.7 shows that these results are driven largely by
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children of birth order 3 or higher.
Every district in West Bengal experienced land reform, so the preceding results capture impacts
of varying progression of tenancy reform across districts. We tested robustness to have a strict
control group in which no tenants were registered, by introducing into the sample all districts of the
neighbouring state of Bihar that are contiguous to West Bengal. The controls are as before (except
for district-level infrastructure and healthcare measures, which are unavailable for Bihar), and include
district-specific trends. These results are shown in Appendix Table A.8; the estimates are essentially
unchanged. Notably, our estimates in Table 4 also remain essentially unaltered if controls for district
rice productivity are dropped. This suggests that PE rather than GE effects were the primary source of
intensified preference for boys in Hindu households with a firstborn daughter, barring imprecision in
the productivity measures.
B Results for Sex Ratio at Birth
We now show impacts of land reform on sex ratio at birth in Table 5. The estimates are reported
conditional on district fixed effects, district rice productivity controls, and district-level linear time
trends, and are robust to the inclusion of all of these.10 In column (1) we find no impact of land reforms
on the probability of the first-born child being male. The same is true for the Hindu and non-Hindu
sub-samples of first-born children in columns (4) and (7). Column (2) however shows that for higher
order births in the pooled sample, there is a statistically significant increase of 3.8 percentage points in
male births following above-median sharecropper registration. The magnitude of this effect in column
(3) is unaffected by the gender of the first-born child. Columns (5) and (6) show that the male-biased
reform impacts on the sex ratio are driven by Hindu families, consistent with the previous literature. The
impact of reform on the probability of higher order births being male rises to a statistically significant
4.5 percentage points among Hindus in column (5), and a larger 5.1 percentage points in column (6)
when the first-born child is a girl. These effects are large, compared to the pre-reform mean of 49.3
percentage points. We find no such evidence of increased male bias in child sex ratios in non-Hindu
families following land reform in columns (8) and (9), though again this may owe to the imprecision of
the estimates associated with the smaller size of the non-Hindu sample.
10We verify that the reform did not affect the sex ratio at birth among first-borns, and also show that the sex ratio results
are robust to the inclusion of cubic and quartic productivity controls in Appendix Table A.9. Coefficient estimates for the
productivity controls are reported in Appendix Table A.10.
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C Results for Son-Biased Fertility Stopping
Table 6 shows the estimated effects of reform on the probability of a child of birth order 2 having a
younger sibling. Again, columns (1)-(3) show results from the pooled sample, and results for the Hindu
and Non-Hindu sub-samples are in columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) respectively. Hence fertility effects and
associated intra-household resource effects cannot account for the observed patterns on infant mortality.
The estimates are stable across specifications with successively richer controls.11
There are two relevant patterns. First, there is little evidence of son-biased fertility stopping in
response to above-median land reform, as the R50kt−1 ∗ f irstson coefficient estimates are statistically
insignificant in all the columns, indicating that our results for infant mortality and the sex ratio are
minimally influenced by fertility responses to reform.12
Second, the tendency is for land reform to lower the probability of transition to a third birth at
25% tenant registration among Hindu families with first-born sons and all non-Hindu families, but
not in Hindu families with first-born daughters. Among Hindus with a first son, the probability of a
third birth declines by a statistically significant 10.8 percentage points (13.4% of the mean pre-reform
probability) once district registration exceeds 25% (and there is no further reduction at 50% coverage).
There are no perceptible effects on fertility stopping after the second birth if the first child is a daughter,
consistent with these families continuing fertility to achieve a son. This ties in with a previous literature
showing that fertility stopping rules are sensitive to the sex of previous births, with families tending to
continue fertility till they have achieved the desired sex composition of births (e.g. Rosenblum (2013)).
First-son families are smaller at baseline because of underlying son-biased fertility stopping. Among
non-Hindus, we see no evidence that land reform leads to changes in the sex ratio at birth or after,
but we see similar son-biased fertility stopping behavior. This is consistent with previous research
which shows that Muslim households (which dominate the non-Hindu sample) exhibit a preference for
sons by continuing fertility to achieve them. In fact non-Hindus exhibit a greater decline in fertility,
consistent with their higher baseline levels of fertility and this is irrespective of the gender of the first
child. At 25% coverage, the decline is, as for Hindus, restricted to first-son families, and as large as
18.2 percentage points (19% of the mean). Once coverage reaches 50%, there is further fertility decline
of 9.6 percentage points.13
11Appendix Table A.11 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of cubic and quartic productivity controls, and
that there are no son-biased fertility stopping effects at birth order 1. Appendix Table A.12 shows that the results are also
robust to the inclusion of bordering control districts in Bihar. Coefficient estimates of productivity are reported in Appendix
Table A.13. Appendix Table A.14 shows these are driven largely by children of birth order 2.
12Including the 25% registration indicator R25k,t−1 and its corresponding interaction terms alongside the R50kt−1 terms
in (10) changes none of the infant mortality and sex ratio results, with the latter terms for above-median registration still
attracting all the large, statistically significant coefficient estimates.
13These results are robust to the inclusion of children born in border districts in the neighbouring state of Bihar; see
Appendix Table A.7.
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D Test for Targeting of Sharecropper Registration
Estimates of (11) for infant mortality are presented in Table 7 and estimates of the same equation for the
probability of a younger sibling and the probability of a male birth in Table 8. We find no statistically
significant correlations in any of the three samples of children between the pre-reform trend in infant
mortality and the intensity of registration in the district in 1985, by either the gender of the child or the
first-born sibling. The coefficients are all also nearly identical to zero.
VI Results from VHPS data
We now present results from estimating (12) using the VHPS dataset. As explained previously, as
we do not observe full birth histories or exact dates of child deaths in these data, we instead model
as outcomes the probability of birth of a female or male child that survived till 2004 in response to
land registered under Operation Barga. On the other hand, the data includes details on landholdings
at the household level, allowing us to examine land reform effects for different land classes. We use
pre-reform landholdings in 1977, and classify households into four categories: landless, marginal,
small and large. The land reform measure is different from NFHS, an indicator for the village crossing
a threshold corresponding to the median of the village-year distribution of proportion of cultivable land
that was registered.
Table 9 presents results for the full sample of households for the period 1978-98, for non-firstborn
female and male children respectively. In each case, we first provide the results for the entire sample,
and then the following four columns present the corresponding results for the four land categories. In
columns (1)-(5), we see no significant impacts of the land reform on birth of surviving girls, irrespective
of the gender of the first-born, for the entire sample as well as for each land category. In contrast, column
(6) shows significant positive effects of land reform on the birth of surviving boys when the first-born
was a girl, driven largely by landless households and small landowning households in columns (7) and
(9) respectively. These effects vanish when the first-born is a boy. The lower bound estimate of male-
biased inheritance effect pi implied by these estimates in column (6) is of the order of 4.9 percentage
points, statistically significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with those we find in the
NFHS data, i.e., an effect of the land reform crossing the median threshold on the sex ratio at birth,
as well as male infant survival probability differences by gender of the first-born child. The reform
impact on the sex ratio unambiguously improved the probability of male births in the NFHS data, but
the positive reform impact on infant survival probability for later born male children only manifested
when the first-born sibling was a girl. The results for the probability of observing a surviving male
child in the VHPS data mirror these patterns.
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We find that the positive effect of reform on the probability of observing surviving boys was driven
mainly by landless and small landowning households. The effects were larger for the latter group, who
were less numerous than the former. This is consistent with our theoretical expectations, wherein the
effect for the landless is driven principally by the PE effect, while that for the small landowners is driven
by a combination of GE and PE effects. The estimated effects for marginal landowners in column (8) is
quantitatively close to those for the landless, but statistically insignificant. The LR effects are smaller
for large landowners in column (10) than for small landowners, possibly because of an adverse PE effect
which neutralized a weak GE effect.
Table 10 shows results from estimating (12) on the Hindu sub-sample of households. Again, we
find no LR impacts on the probability of observing a surviving girl child across households in any
landholding category in columns (1)-(5). However in column (6), we find a positive, statistically
significant increase of 3.7 percentage points in the probability of observing a male surviving child in
a Hindu household without a first son. This effect vanishes for corresponding families with a first
son. The implied estimate of the male-biased inheritance effect is 4.0 percentage points, statistically
significant at the 5% level. While the estimates in the sub-samples further split by landholding category
in columns (7)-(10) are largely statistically insignificant due to a smaller number of observations than in
Table 9, the coefficient estimates in column (8) again indicate that the effects are driven by landless and
small landowners. The estimate of the inheritance effect is significant at the 5% level for the landless.
Table 11 shows corresponding results for the non-Hindu sub-sample. We find a statistically signif-
icant increase of 10.6 percentage points in the probability of observing a surviving male child among
households without a first son in column (6), but no such effects for girls in columns (1)-(5). This
is consistent with the evidence for son-biased fertility stopping among non-Hindus in Table 6. This
effect appears to be partially offset if the first-born child is male, as in the pooled sample and in the
Hindu sub-sample. However the interaction term of the first-born son indicator with the above-median
reform indicator is statistically insignificant, preventing us from stating this with much confidence.
The samples divided further by land category across columns (7)-(10) do not yield meaningful results,
possibly due to the small number of observations in each regression.
Finally, Table 12 shows how results for the full sample are affected when we control for district-year
fixed effects which absorb any district-specific shocks to rice productivity or other factors that could
otherwise affect child survival.14 The addition of these fixed effects does very little to change the
estimated coefficients from those in Table 9.
14We do not use estimates of farm productivity used in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) because this would have unduly
restricted the number of years of data used in the regression (as farm productivity estimates are available only between 1982
and 1996, for between three and four years for each village).
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VII Conclusions
We find that increased property rights security exacerbates gender discrimination in Hindu families,
with parents manipulating sex ratios at birth and after birth until the age of one, so as to increase the
chances of survival of at least one son to inherit the family property. Land reform is also associated
with greater son-biased fertility-stopping, widening sibship size differences between first-son and first-
daughter families. This is in contrast to evidence from other settings that land reform alters existing
gender-unequal institutions in favour of women, for instance, tenure regularisation is argued to have
significantly improve women’s tenurial and inheritance claims to land in Rwanda (Ali et al. (2014)),
and joint spousal titling increased women’s intra-household bargaining power in Peru (Wiig (2013)).
Male-biased inheritance law in India appears to have resulted in very different outcomes.
The pattern of our results increase confidence that our findings are driven bymale-biased inheritance
effects, rather than by wealth effects of land reform. We find that land reform has opposite effects in
families with first-sons vs first-daughters. In particular, if as in the China study, wealth effects of the
reform raised the demand for sons, we would not expect to see a smaller increase in male child survival
in families with first-born sons. An alternative explanation of land reform strengthening the desire to
have sons is that it raises the returns to labour, and males are more likely to be employed as farm labour.
Using detailed farm-level data gathered alongside the West Bengal village survey data, we estimated
whether the ratio of male to female labour was modified by land reform and find no evidence that it
was.15 We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that greater share of males among farm labour at
baseline drives some of the identified effects of land reform on son preference. Even if this was the case,
this channel is closely related to our preferred explanation based on male biased inheritance patterns.
As elucidated in the Introduction, the labour supply of sons on family farms and their inheritance rights
are closely tied: patrilocality involves married sons co-residing with or living very close to their parents,
while married daughters marry some distance away from the natal home, so that it is primarily sons
who work on family land and subsequently inherit it.
Our results on fertility-stopping further increase confidence that we are capturing male-biased
inheritance effects of reform and not wealth effects. Almond et al. (2013b) find a small positive effect
of land reform on fertility (after controlling for the negative effects of the One Child Policy), which is
consistent with income effects being a dominant mechanism in China because income tends to raise
fertility in low-income settings (Currie and Schwandt (2014); Vogl (2013); Bhalotra and Rocha (2013)).
In contrast, we find a negative effect of land reform on fertility. In the non-Hindu sample where the sex
ratio of births appears not to be manipulated by parents, we find across-the-board reductions in fertility
after land reform. In the Hindu sample, fertility reduction is restricted to families that have a first-son,
15These results are available upon request.
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while first-daughter families continue fertility to achieve a son.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Share of Tenants Registered by Year
Notes: The figure shows the average rate of completed sharecropper registration across the 14 West
Bengal districts in the Banerjee et. al (2002) data during 1975-1991.
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Figure 2: Proportion of villages above the median share of land registration
Notes: The figure shows the proportion of villages above the median share of land registration across
the 89 villages from the VHPS dataset during the years 1968-1998. The percent of cultivable land
registered declines after 1985 as registration slowed during this period, while the amount of cultivable
land increased on average.
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Figure 3: Infant Mortality of Hindu Children
(a) First-born Children
(b) Children with First-born Sisters
(c) Children with First-born Brothers
Notes: The figure shows coefficient estimates from an annual event study of years before and after a district
achieves median sharecropper registration. The covariates in the specification are the same as in (10)
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Table 1: DHS Summary Statistics
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean S.D. Min Max Observations
Panel A Mother Characteristics: 1967-93
Years of Education 3.416 4.297 0 18 6,443
Age at Birth 19.034 3.532 5 40 6,468
Total Births 3.386 2.010 1 11 6,468
Hindu 0.750 - 0 1 6,468
Rural 0.680 - 0 1 6,468
Panel B Child Outcomes: 1967-93
Infant Death 0.094 - 0 1 20,148
Neonatal Death 0.064 - 0 1 20,148
Male Child 0.511 - 0 1 20,148
Has Younger Sibling 0.718 - 0 1 20,148
Panel C District Productivity and Programmes: 1977-90
Rice Productivity 1.473 0.434 0.720 2.595 196
Patta Area Per Capita 6.518 4.937 0.321 17.986 196
Surfaced Roads Per Capita 0.208 0.067 0.115 0.392 196
Medical Institutions Per Capita 0.056 0.016 0.033 0.115 196
Notes: Panel A shows mother characteristics, and Panel B shows child outcomes for cohorts born
during 1967-1993. Panel C shows productivity and programme statistics in the 14 districts with
sharecropper registration data for years 1977-1990, which are the years for which they enter as
controls in the regressions. Neonatal death takes value 1 if the child dies aged 0-1 months, and
infant death takes value 1 if the child dies aged 0-12 months.
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Table 2: VHPS Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max Observations
Panel A Household characteristics (1978-1998)
Hindu 0.807 - 0 1 1,946
Immigrant 0.252 - 0 1 1,946
Landless in 1977 0.501 - 0 1 1,946
Marginal in 1977 0.163 - 0 1 1,946
Small in 1977 0.090 - 0 1 1,946
Large in 1977 0.246 - 0 1 1,946
Household size 5.454 2.030 1 22 1,946
Boys 0.756 0.915 0 7 1,946
Girls 0.812 0.957 0 6 1,946
Panel B Household-Year characteristics (1978-1998)
Boy birth and survival 0.060 - 0 1 24,696
Girl birth and survival 0.064 - 0 1 24,696
Agricultural Land (acres) 2.237 3.568 0 36 24,696
Panel C Village-Year characteristics (1978-1998)
% Land Registered 0.051 0.106 0.000 0.516 1,825
Log(rice productivity) 0.491 0.330 -0.440 1.119 1,825
Notes: All sources are listed in the text. In Panel C, % Land Registered has
been winsorized at the 98.5th percentile due to 2 villages that exhibit
abnormally high land registration in various years.
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Table 3: Predicted Effects: Land Reform on Child Survival
Male Child Female Child
First son = 0
Model Effect: a + pi a + δ1
Predicted Effect: (γ1 + γ3) (γ1)
NFHS Estimate: −[η + ρ2] −[η]
VHPS Estimate: {φM1 } {φF1 }
First son = 1
Model Effect a + δ3 a + δ1 + δ2
Predicted Effect: (γ1 + γ2 + γ3 + γ4) (γ1 + γ2)
NFHS Estimate: −[η + ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3] −[η + ρ1]
VHPS Estimate: {φM1 + φM2 } {φF1 + φF2 }
Notes: The table shows the predicted effects of land reform on child
survival and the corresponding empirical model parameters identified
by (10) for infant mortality using the NFHS data (square brackets) and
by (12) for birth-cum-survival using the VHPS data (curly brackets)
by gender of the child, and the gender of the child’s firstborn sibling.
36
Table 4: NFHS: Infant Mortality
Infant Death
All Children Hindu Children Non-Hindu Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
R50t−1 ∗ f irstson ∗ male 0.050 0.067 0.066 0.068* 0.093* 0.093* 0.016 0.016 0.019
(0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051) (0.044) (0.056) (0.053)
R50t−1 ∗ male -0.044*** -0.039* -0.039* -0.056*** -0.063** -0.064** -0.018 0.011 0.008
(0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.039) (0.048) (0.048)
R50t−1 ∗ f irstson -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 -0.066** -0.060* -0.059* 0.022 0.006 0.008
(0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.038) (0.048) (0.050)
R50t−1 0.002 -0.003 -0.016 0.027* 0.020 0.015 -0.054 -0.054 -0.082*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.032) (0.038) (0.046)
f irstson ∗ male -0.014 -0.002 -0.004 0.040 0.088 0.081 -0.102 -0.144 -0.134
(0.143) (0.162) (0.163) (0.172) (0.194) (0.199) (0.256) (0.268) (0.258)
male -0.170 -0.139 -0.137 -0.157 -0.149 -0.148 -0.177 -0.140 -0.136
(0.152) (0.135) (0.139) (0.141) (0.126) (0.130) (0.265) (0.271) (0.258)
f irstson 0.001 0.010 0.008 -0.069 -0.045 -0.047 0.109 0.100 0.091
(0.097) (0.102) (0.106) (0.149) (0.139) (0.139) (0.268) (0.281) (0.271)
District FE x x x x x x x x x
District Productivity x x x x x x
District-Year Trend x x x
ME: Boys, first-born brother -0.026 -0.011 -0.024 -0.027 -0.009 -0.016 -0.034** -0.021 -0.047*
ME: Girls, first-born brother -0.032** -0.039** -0.051*** -0.039** -0.039** -0.045** -0.032 -0.047 -0.073
ME: Boys, first-born sister -0.042*** -0.043** -0.055*** -0.028 -0.042* -0.049* -0.072** -0.043 -0.073**
ME: Girls, first-born sister 0.002 -0.003 -0.016 0.027* 0.020 0.015 -0.054* -0.054 -0.082*
Observations 8,367 8,367 8,367 5,448 5,448 5,448 2,919 2,919 2,919
Pre-Reform y Mean 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.074 0.074 0.074
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91
Districts 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: NFHS data. y refers to the dependent variable. ME refers to marginal effect. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Samples include children of birth order 2 or higher. All specifications also include birth year fixed effects, birth order fixed effects, year of
interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear
and quadratic terms of the mother’s age at which the child is born. Lagged district covariates include logs of patta land area distributed, number
of medical institutions, and kilometres of surfaced road per capita, and their two-way and three-way interactions with the male child and the
first-born son indicators. The statistical significance of the marginal effects is calculated using robust, clustered standard errors. ***p < 0.01 ;
**p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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Table 5: NFHS: Sex Ratio at Birth
Child is Male
All Children Hindu Children Non-Hindu Children
B. Ord. 1 B. Ord.> 1 B. Ord.> 1 B. Ord. 1 B. Ord.> 1 B. Ord.> 1 B. Ord. 1 B. Ord.> 1 B. Ord.> 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
R50t−1 ∗ f irstson - - -0.012 - - -0.012 - - -0.005
(0.022) (0.024) (0.047)
R50t−1 -0.019 0.034* 0.040 -0.071 0.045** 0.051* 0.109 0.031 0.033
(0.036) (0.020) (0.027) (0.050) (0.022) (0.028) (0.061) (0.032) (0.042)
f irstson - -0.007 0.091 - -0.009 0.188 - -0.006 -0.017
(0.008) (0.089) (0.010) (0.117) (0.017) (0.223)
District FE x x x x x x x x x
District Productivity x x x x x x x x x
District-Year Trend x x x x x x x x x
Observations 3,248 8,367 8,367 2,323 5,448 5,448 925 2,919 2,919
Pre-Reform y Mean 0.449 0.494 0.494 0.433 0.493 0.493 0.488 0.498 0.498
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91
Districts 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: NFHS data. y refers to the dependent variable. B. Ord refers to birth order. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. All
specifications also include birth year fixed effects, birth order fixed effects, year of interview fixed effects, indicators for household religion and
caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of the mother’s age at which the child is born.
Lagged district covariates include logs of rice yield, patta land area distributed, number of medical institutions, and kilometres of surfaced road per
capita and their corresponding interactions with the male child and the first-born son indicators. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 6: NFHS: Son-Biased Fertility Stopping
Child Has a Younger Sibling
All Children Hindu Children Non-Hindu Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
R50t−1 ∗ f irstson -0.007 0.009 0.012 -0.011 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.020 0.019
(0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051) (0.053) (0.049) (0.056) (0.051) (0.050)
R25t−1 ∗ f irstson -0.118*** -0.114** -0.116** -0.106** -0.104** -0.108** -0.179** -0.179** -0.182**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.075) (0.082) (0.084)
R50t−1 -0.048* -0.048* -0.048 -0.035 -0.035 -0.038 -0.087** -0.087** -0.096*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.050)
R25t−1 0.022 -0.001 -0.020 0.016 -0.008 -0.058 0.010 0.000 0.036
(0.040) (0.041) (0.056) (0.057) (0.065) (0.079) (0.062) (0.061) (0.082)
f irstson -0.315 -0.223 -0.201 -0.436 -0.343 -0.347 0.108 0.150 0.205
(0.210) (0.193) (0.193) (0.265) (0.247) (0.262) (0.131) (0.114) (0.129)
District FE x x x x x x x x x
District Productivity x x x x x x
District-Year Trend x x x
Observations 2,686 2,686 2,686 1,919 1,919 1,919 767 767 767
Pre-Reform y Mean 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.952 0.952 0.952
Cohorts 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91 1978-91
Districts 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: NFHS data. y refers to the dependent variable. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The sample in every
column is children of birth order 2 only. All specifications include birth year fixed effects, year of interview fixed effects, indicators for
household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of the
mother’s age at which the child is born. Lagged district covariates include logs of patta land area distributed, number of medical
institutions, and kilometres of surfaced road per capita and their corresponding interactions with the male child and the first-born son
indicators. ***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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Table 7: NFHS: Test of Targeted Registration, Infant Mortality
Infant Death
All Children Hindu Children Non-Hindu Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
treated ∗ trend -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
treated ∗ trend ∗ male - 0.007 -0.006 - -0.008 -0.008 - -0.006 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
treated ∗ trend ∗ f irstson ∗ male - - -0.003 - - -0.001 - - -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
District FE x x x x x x x x x
Observations 3,389 3,389 3,389 2,428 2,428 2,428 961 961 961
Cohorts 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77
Districts 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: NFHS data. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Samples include children of birth order 2 or higher. All specifications
also include the female child and first-born son indicators and their three-way and two-way interactions with the trend and treatment indicator, birth
year fixed effects, indicators for household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and
quadratic terms of the mother’s age at which the child is born. ***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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Table 8: NFHS: Test of Targeted Registration, Male Births and Fertility
All Children Hindu Children Non-Hindu Children
Male Child Younger Sibling Male Child Younger Sibling Male Child Younger Sibling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated ∗ trend 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
treated ∗ trend ∗ f irstson - -0.009 - -0.012 - 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
District FE x x x x x x
Observations 3,389 1,369 2,428 1,015 961 354
Cohorts 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77 1958-77
Districts 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: NFHS data. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Samples for the sex ratio regressions include children of
birth order 2 or higher, and of birth order 2 for the fertility regressions. The specifications for the probability of having a younger sibling
also include the first-born son indicator and its interaction with the trend and treatment indicator, birth year fixed effects, indicators for
household religion and caste, whether the household is rural, mother’s educational attainment, and linear and quadratic terms of the
mother’s age at which the child is born. ***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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Table 9: VHPS: Pooled sample, by Gender of First Child
Female Surviving Child Male Surviving Child
Land Category: All Landless Marginal Small Large All Landless Marginal Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Agricultural land -0.003* - -0.006 0.007 -0.004* -0.001 - -0.002 0.005 -0.000
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002)
LR -0.000 -0.003 0.016 -0.036 0.005 0.051*** 0.044* 0.046 0.101** 0.021
(0.016) (0.025) (0.029) (0.053) (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.030) (0.049) (0.031)
Firstson 0.003 0.007 -0.026 -0.043 0.029 -0.211*** -0.228*** -0.193*** -0.125** -0.230***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.026) (0.052) (0.018) (0.015) (0.023) (0.032) (0.049) (0.028)
LR ∗ Firstson 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.026 -0.002 -0.049*** -0.052** -0.048 -0.113** -0.005
(0.016) (0.024) (0.034) (0.053) (0.023) (0.017) (0.025) (0.030) (0.051) (0.032)
Observations 24,696 10,213 4,155 2,497 7,789 24,696 10,213 4,155 2,497 7,789
Households 1,946 974 317 173 480 1,946 974 317 173 480
Notes: Village panel survey data 1978-98, children of birth order 2 or above. Robust standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. LR
indicates above-median registration of the cumulative share of village cultivable land by district-year. Controls include a land ceiling indicator,
year and household fixed effects, and cumulative village land distributed. Household land ownership category is defined by landholdings in 1977.
The data is for years 1982-1995. ***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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Table 10: VHPS: Hindu sample, by Gender of First Child
Female Surviving Child Male Surviving Child
Land Category: All Landless Marginal Small Large All Landless Marginal Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Agricultural land -0.002 - -0.011 0.009 -0.003 -0.002 - -0.003 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
LR 0.001 0.016 0.020 -0.060 -0.011 0.037** 0.038 0.037 0.082 -0.007
(0.019) (0.025) (0.039) (0.067) (0.025) (0.017) (0.029) (0.030) (0.059) (0.022)
Firstson -0.006 0.002 -0.010 -0.061 0.003 -0.225*** -0.235*** -0.213*** -0.171*** -0.231***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.031) (0.056) (0.024) (0.014) (0.021) (0.035) (0.050) (0.026)
LR ∗ Firstson 0.002 -0.008 -0.001 0.046 0.007 -0.040** -0.051* -0.050 -0.097 0.019
(0.018) (0.025) (0.041) (0.065) (0.024) (0.016) (0.029) (0.031) (0.060) (0.025)
Observations 20,274 8,473 3,288 2,148 6,323 20,274 8,473 3,288 2,148 6,323
Households 1,571 808 239 144 378 1,571 808 239 144 378
Notes: Village panel survey data 1978-98, children of birth order 2 or above. Robust standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. LR
indicates above-median registration of the cumulative share of village cultivable land by district-year. Controls include a land ceiling indicator,
year and household fixed effects, and cumulative village land distributed. Household land ownership category is defined by landholdings in 1977.
The data is for years 1982-1995. The data is for years 1982-1995. ***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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Table 11: VHPS: Non-Hindu sample, by Gender of First Child
Female Surviving Child Male Surviving Child
Land Category: All Landless Marginal Small Large All Landless Marginal Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Agricultural land -0.008** - -0.005 -0.033 -0.008*** 0.005 - -0.001 0.065*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.019) (0.029) (0.003) (0.004) (0.022) (0.013) (0.004)
LR -0.005 -0.041 -0.014 0.006 0.018 0.106** 0.085 0.069 0.146 0.180
(0.026) (0.068) (0.045) (0.069) (0.062) (0.042) (0.064) (0.055) (0.146) (0.119)
Firstson 0.029 0.046 -0.066 0.095 0.076** -0.159*** -0.175 -0.170*** -0.031 -0.216***
(0.027) (0.087) (0.045) (0.129) (0.034) (0.041) (0.108) (0.048) (0.198) (0.045)
LR ∗ Firstson 0.025 0.055 0.035 -0.010 0.017 -0.076 -0.080 -0.042 -0.129 -0.138
(0.029) (0.062) (0.070) (0.072) (0.054) (0.045) (0.064) (0.053) (0.168) (0.116)
Observations 4,422 1,740 867 349 1,466 4,422 1,740 867 349 1,466
Households 375 166 78 29 102 375 166 78 29 102
Notes: Village panel survey data 1978-98, children of birth order 2 or above. Robust standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. LR indicates
above-median registration of the cumulative share of village cultivable land by district-year. Controls include a land ceiling indicator, year and
household fixed effects, and cumulative village land distributed. Household land ownership category is defined by landholdings in 1977. The data is
for years 1982-1995. The data is for years 1982-1995. ***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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Table 12: VHPS: Pooled sample, by Gender of First Child, with District-Year Fixed Effects
Female Surviving Child Male Surviving Child
Land Category: All Landless Marginal Small Large All Landless Marginal Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Agricultural land -0.003 - -0.009 0.001 -0.003 -0.000 - 0.004 0.006 0.000
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002)
LR -0.004 -0.008 0.020 0.013 0.021 0.060*** 0.058** 0.036 0.073 0.056
(0.017) (0.027) (0.036) (0.069) (0.028) (0.017) (0.025) (0.031) (0.049) (0.036)
Firstson 0.004 0.007 -0.023 0.007 0.034* -0.213*** -0.225*** -0.206*** -0.134** -0.215***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.029) (0.058) (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.034) (0.057) (0.027)
LR ∗ Firstson 0.005 0.018 0.002 -0.062 -0.014 -0.046*** -0.053* -0.042 -0.098* -0.018
(0.016) (0.027) (0.036) (0.066) (0.027) (0.017) (0.028) (0.033) (0.049) (0.034)
Observations 24,696 10,213 4,155 2,497 7,789 24,696 10,213 4,155 2,497 7,789
Households 1,946 974 317 173 480 1,946 974 317 173 480
Notes: Village panel survey data 1978-98, children of birth order 2 or above. Robust standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. LR
indicates above-median registration of the cumulative share of village cultivable land by district-year. Controls include a land ceiling indicator,
year, household and year*district fixed effects, and cumulative village land distributed. Household land ownership category is defined by
landholdings in 1977. The data is for years 1982-1995. The data is for years 1982-1995. ***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; *p < 0.10.
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